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ANGUS v. DALTON.

tion ought to be dismissed. The language to be construed, is plain
and scarcely capable of being misunderstood. The contract binds
the defendant to pay ten years after date the principal named, " with
interest annually at seven per cent. per annum until paid." The
rate of interest is fixed by the words "seven per cent. per annum."
The time of payment is prescribed by the words "interest annually."
No other construction will give due force to all of the words used.
The language construed in the cases cited by counsel is different
from that used in the note before us. These cases, therefore, are
not applicable to the question under consideration.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
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In an action by the owners of a factory against the defendants for excavating
the soil of an adjoining house in such a manner as to leave the foundation of part
of the factory without sufficient lateral support, and thereby causing it to fall, it
appeared that the two buildings had apparently been erected at the same time, and
were estimated to be upwards of one hundred years old. Both had been occupied
as dwelling-houses until about twenty-seven years before the accident, but the
plaintiffs' predecessor had then converted his house into a coach factory, removing
the internal walls, and erecting a stack of brickwork which both served as a chimney
stack, and supported the girders which had to be put up to sustain the floors. The
defendants, in taking down the adjoining house and in digging cellars which had
not previously existed, left a support for the chimney stack which proved insufficient, and it fell, drawing after it the entire factory : Held, by the majority of the
court (CocKERN, C. J., and MELLOn, J.), that the defendants were entitled to
judgment, for first, no grant of a right of lateral support for the factory by the adjacent land could be presumed from the enjoyment of such support by the plaintiff
for twenty years, inasmuch as the owners of this land never had any power to
oppose the conversion of the dwelling-house into a factory, and hau no reasonable
means of resisting or preventing the enjoyment by such factory of lateral snpport
from the adjoining soil, and for the same reason such support was not an easement
which had been enjoyed for twenty years within the Prescription Act (2 & 3 Wm.
4, c. 71, s. 2), as it could not be said t6 have been enjoyed by a person claiming
right thereto and without interruption.
By LusH, J., dissenting, that, after twenty years' enjoyment without physical
obstruction of such support for the land with the factory upon it, it must be presumed that it had been enjoyed by virtue of some grant or agreement ; that the
mere absence of assent on the part of the adjoining owner was immaterial, and
that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment.
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The right to lateral support for a building superadded to the soil is an easement,
as (listinguished from the proprietary right to such support for the soil itself in its

natural .tate.
Every easement must originate in grant, except those that are conclusively presumed by force of statutory provisions, or presumed by prescription from lapse of
time.

Th history of the legal doctrine of prescriptive easements, and the authorities
reviewed and discussed by CocKBua, C. J.
MOTION by defendhnt for judgment gion obstante veredicto. The facts
appear in the olpitiou of
CocKtuitN, C. J.-This is a case of very great importance as regards
the law of easements. It is an action brought against the defendant,
Dalton, a builder, and the Commissioners of Works and Buildings, by
whom Dalton was employed, for excavating under the soil of premises
belonging to the commissioners, by means of which an adjoining coach
factory of the plaintiffis, to which they allege that- they, as owners of
the factory, had a right of lateral support from the soil adjacent, was
caused to Call.
The facts were as follows : The plaintiffs tre the owners in fee of a
coach factory at Newcastle-upon-Tyne, erected by them some twentyseven years before the event complained of. Prior to that time the
premises had been a dwelling-house, as had also been the adjoining
premises, now purchased by the defendants, the commissioners, for the
purpose of converting them into a probate office. While both houses
still stood they appeared to be coeval in point of age, and there was
reason to think that they had stood for about a hundred years. Though
immediately contiguous, there was no party-wall between them. Each,
as I understand the facts, rested on its own walls, built to the extremity
of the soil of the respective owner. In this state of things the plaintiffs, at the time already stated, namely, twenty-seven years before the
alleged cause of action, altered the character of the house belonging to
them, and constructed a coach factory in its place. They removed the
supports on which the fabric had previously rested, and substituted for
them a stack of brickwork, which they carried to the extremity of their
soil, and which served at once as a chinmey stack and as a support to
the main girders by which the upper stories of the factory were upheld.
They did this without any grant from'the owner of the adjoining premises of any right of lateral support, or any assent on his part to the use
of such support, unless his assent is to be inferred from his taking no
steps to resist the acquisition and enjoyment of such an easement.
The Commissioners of' Works having purchased the adjoining house,
with the intention, as I have said, of erecting a probate office on its
site, employed the defendant, Dalton. to take down the house, and prepare the ground for the erection of the intended office. In doing this,
according to the plans for the new office, it became necessary to take
down the wall adjoining the plaintiffs' premises, and to excavate the
ground to the extremity of the defendants' own soil. It was not contended on the trial that in doing this they were guilty of any negligence. They took such measures as appeared necessary to prevent any
damage to the plaintiffs premises. In excavating they left a thick

ANGUS v. DALTON.
pillar of clay, which might well have been deemed sufficient for the
purpose, immediately round the plaintiffs' stack, for the purpose of supporting it. But on exposure to the air the clay cracked and gave way,
and the pillar, being by the excavation deprived of the lateral support
which it had previously derived from the adjacent soil, gave way and
fell, and, falling, brought down the factory, which, as has been said,
rested mainly upon it.
It is scarcely necessary to observe that any easement of"lateral support, which may have attached to the plaintiffs' premises as the house
before stood, was lost by the taking down of the old house and substituting a building of an entirely different construction as regards the wall
or foundation on which it rested. No question arises, therefore, as to
whether, if the house had been reconstructed as it stood before, the
right to support would still have remained. The construction of the
premises as altered was entirely different. As the house previously
stood the weight, if supported by the defendants' adjacent soil, was sup.
ported by the entire range of that soil. In the new building the weight
rested entirely on the chimney-stack, and was thus concentrated on one
spot. It may well be that, if the plaintiffs' former construction had
remained, the defendants' soil, notwithstanding the excavation, would
have sufficed to support the building. The nature of the easement thus
became essentially different, and the easement now claimed must therefore depend upon the effect of the support having been afforded during
the twenty-seven years.
The only question, therefore, is whether by the enjoyment of the
lateral support to their factory from the adjacent soil for the time stated,
without more, the plaintiffs had acquired an easement which prevented
the commissioners-from dealing as they pleased with their own land for
legitimate purposes. I am of opinion that they had not, and consequently that the defendants are not responsible for what has happened.
That the right to the lateral support of the adjacent soil for a building which has been superadded to the soil is an easement, as distinguished from the proprietary right to such support for the soil itself in
its natural condition, is undoubted. Equally certain is it that, except
where the positive law steps in, and, in the absence of any legal origin,
gives to a fixed period of possession or enjoyment the status of absolute
and indisputable right, every easement as against the owner of the soil
must have had its origin in grant. Upon both these points the authorities are uniform and positive. It is no doubt equally true that, in the
absence of proof of any grant, the existence of a lost grant may be
And in no system of jurisprupresumed from length of enjoyment.
dence has this doctrine been carried to greater lengths than in our own.
In the absence of any sufficient law regulating the period of prescription, judges, to make up this deficiency, were in the habit of directing
juries to presume grants, in the past or possible existence of which no
one believed-a practice to be deprecated, and, in spite of precedent, to
be followed with great reserve, and certainly with no disposition to
extend it.
Looking to the importance of the question here involved, and to the
fact that the law as to .lateral support, not having hitherto been brought
before a court in bane, has not been made the subject of authoritative
decision, it may be useful to trace the growth of this doctrine as to pre.
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sumption and the extent to which it has been carried, and for this pur.
pose, to review the authorities on the law of prescriptive easements.
At the common law there appears to have existed no fixed period of
prescription. Rights were acquired by prescription when possession or
enjoyment had existed beyond the memory of man, or where, as the
legal phrase was, " the memory of man ran not to the contrary." But
by several statutes, fixed periods were limited for the bringing of actions
for the recovery of real estate. Prior to the Statute of Merton, Bractont
tells us that the limitation in a writ of right was from the time of Henry
I., that is to say, from the year 1100, or 135 years : L. 2, f. 179.
By the statute of Merton (20 Hen. 3, c. 8), the limitation in the writ
of right was from the time of Henry II., a period of seventy years.
Writs of mort d'ancestor, and of entry, were not to pass the last return
of King John from Ireland, a period of twenty-five years. Writs of
novel disseisin were not to pass the first voyage of the king into Gascony, a period of fifteen years.
New periods of limitation were fixed by the Statute of Westminster,
3 Edw. 1, c. 39 (1275). By this statute the time for bringing a writ
of right was limited to the time of King Richard I., a peribd of eightyeight years. Writs of mort d'ancestor, of cosinage, of aiel, and of entry,
were limited to the 'coronation of Henry III., about fifty-eight years.
The writ of novel disseisin was to remain limited as before, namely, to
the passage of Henry III. into Gascony.
It is plain that this statute had reference to actions for the -recovery
of real estate. Nevertheless the judges, with that, assumption of legislative authority which has at times characterized our judicature, proceeded to apply the rule as to prescription established by the statute to
incorporeal hereditaments, and, among others, to easetnents. ,
As might have been foreseen, as time went on, the limitation thus
fixed became attended with the inconvenience arising from the impossibility of carrying back the proof of possession or enjoyment to a period
which, aftera generation or two, ceased to be within the reach of evidence.
But, here again, the legislature not intervening, the judges provided a
remedy by holding that if the proof was carried back as far as living
memory would go, it should be presumed that the right claimed had
existed from time of legal memory, that is to say, from the time of
Richard I. This convenient rule having been established, the judges
seeui not to have thought it worth while, when the statute of 31 Hen.
8, c. 2, was passed,.by which in a writ of right the time was limited to
sixty years, to apply, by an analogous use of that statute, the time of
prescription established by it tb actions involving rights to incorporeal
hereditaments.
In a case of Bury v. Pope. Cro. Eliz. 118, in an action for stopping
lights, according to the report, " It was agreed by all the justices that
if two men be owners of two parcels of land adjoining, and one of them
doth build a house upon his land, and makes windows and lights looking
into the other's lands, and the house and the lights have continued by
the space of thirty or forty years, yet the other may upon his own land
and soil lawfully erect an house or other things against the said lights
and windows, and the other can have no action ; for it was his folly to
build his house so near to the other's land; and it was adjudged
accordingly."
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And as late as 1 Car. 2, it was held in a case of Sury v. Piggott,
Poph. 166, that to maintain an action for obstructing lights, the light
must be prescribed for as having been enjoyed time out of mind.
But the statute of Jac. 1, o. 21, which limited the time fbr bringing
a possessory action to twenty years, led soon afterwards to a very
important change in the law by the arbitrary adoption of that period by
the courts as sufficient to found the presumption of the existence of a
right from the time of legal memory. Here again, thd boldness of
judicial decision stepped in to make up for defects in the law which the
supineness of the legislature left uncared for. But it is to be observed,
and the observation is specially important to the present purpose, that
with all their desire to reduce the period of prescription within reasonable limits, the courts never gave greater effect to length of enjoyment
than that of affording a presumption of prescriptive right, capable of
being rebutted by proof of an origin at a time later than that of legal
memory. Hence, if in the course of a cause it appeared that the dis-puted right had had a later origin, the presumption failed, and the claim
of right was defeated.
The frequehey of this result gave rise to a new device. As, independently of prescription, every incorporeal hereditament must have
had its origin in grant, the fiction was resorted to of presuming after
long user a grant by a deed which in the lapse of time had been lost.
At first, to raise this presumption it was required that the user should
be carkied back as far as living memory would go; but after the statute
of James, user for twenty years was-here again, without any warrant
of legislative authority, and by the arbitrary ruling of the judges-held
to be sufficient to raise this presumption of a lost grant, and juries were
directed so to find in cases in which no one had the faintest belief that
any grant had ever existed, and where the presumption was known to
be a mere fiction. Well might Sir W. D. EVANS, while admitting the
utility of this doctrine, say that its introduction was "a perversion of
legal principles and an unwarrantable assumption of authority." 2 Ev.
Poth. 139.
Thus the law remained till the Act of 2 & 3 Win. 4, c. 71, was
passed, with the view of putting an end to the scandal on the administration of justice, which arose from thus forcing the consciences of
juries. How far it has effected this purpose will be seen further on.
But this doctrine of presumption from user or enjoyment under the
former law could not, according to the highest authorities, be 'carried,
as regarded the presumption of a lost grant, any more than that which
had reference to the existence of an easement beyond time of legal
memory, further than that of a presumption capable of being rebutted
and so destroyed. It is true that in an early case of Lewis v. Price, 2
Sir E. Williams' Saund. 504, note, which was an action on the case for
obstructing the plaintiff's lights, where the house had been built forty
years, WILMOT, J., told the jury that the action lay, saying that "this
was founded on the same reason as when lights have been immemorial,
for this is long enough to induce a presumption that there was originally
some agreement between the parties." And he -added, that "twenty
years was sufficient to give a man a title in ejectment, in which he
might recover the house itself: and he therefore saw no reason- why it
VOL. XXVI.-82
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should not be sufficient to entitle him to any easement belonging to the
house."
So, in a subsequent case of Dougal v. Wilson, 2 Sir E. Williams'
Saund. 504, which was also an action for obstructing lights, on the
defendant's attempting to show that the lights had not existed for more
than sixty years, the same judge said, "If a man has been in possession
of a house, with lights belonging to it, for fifty or sixty years, no man
can stop up those lights., Possession for such a length of time amounts
to a grant of the liberty of making them; it is evidence of an agreement to make them. If I am in possession of an estate for so long a
period as sixty years, I cannot be disturbed even by a writ of rightthe highest writ in the law. If my possession of the house cannot be
disturbed, shall I be disturbed in my lights ? It would be absurd."
He adds, " And I should think a much shorter time than sixty yeats
might be sufficient." From this language it would no doubt appear
that the learned judge considered that, after such a length of possession as would be a bar to an action to recover an estate under the
statutes of Henry VIII. or James I., the presumption in favor of a
grant in the case of an easement would become absolute. But this view
of the law was corrected in the case of Dorwin v. Upton, 2 Sir E. Willianis' Saund. 506, which came before the Court of King's Bench on a
motion for a new trial in an action -which had been tried before GouLD,
J., in which it was alleged that the learned judge had directed the jury
that twenty-five years' possession was an absolute bar, incapable of being
overturned by any contrary proof, whereas it was only n presumptive
proof which might be explained -away. Lord MANSFIELD, in giving
judgment explains the value and effect of presumptions of this nature,
and places the doctrine on its true footing. Ie say, "The enjyment
of lights with the defendants' acquiescence for twenty years is such
decisive presumption of a right by grant or otherwise that, unless contradicted or explained, the jury ought to believe it; but it is impossible
that length of time can be said to be an abgolute bar, like a Statute of
Limitations ; it is certainly a presumptive bar which ought to go to a
jury. Thus, in the case of a bond there is no Statute of Limitations
that bars an action upon it, but there is a time when a jury may presume the debt. to be discharged, as if no interest appear to have been
paid for sixteen or twenty years. The same rule prevails in the case of
a highway. Time immemorial itself is only presumptive evidence, for
so it was held in the case of The Mayor of Kingston-upon-llullv. .or."
ner, Cowp. 102. In a case befbre me at Maidstone. 1 held length of
time, when unanswered and unexplained, to be a bar." WILLES, J.,
said, "There was a case before me at York, where I held uninterrupted
possession of a pew for twenty years to be presumptive evidence merely,
and that opinion was afterwards confirmed in the Court of Common
Pleas." And BULLER, J., says, " I incline very much to think that
the judge was misunderstood, for he could never call it an absolute bar.
In the Wells Harbour Case, this court went fully into the doctrine, and
the rule of law is clear that length of time is presumptive evidence only.
The judge said; ' I think twenty years' uninterrupted possession of these
windows is a sufficient right for the plaintiff's enjoyment of them.'
Now, that expression is open to a double construction. If the judge
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meant it was an absolute bar, he was certainly wrong, if only as a presumptive bar, he was right."
The learned editor adds that the next day BULLER, J, said that
AstURST, J., had waited on Mr. J. GOULD, who said he had never had
an idea but what it was a question for a jury, and would have left it to
the jury if the counsel for the defendant had asked it; that he compared it to the case of trover, where a demand and refusal are evidence
of, but not an actual conversion. Upon this the rule was discharged.
In the case of The M11ayor if Rull v. Horner, 1 Cowp. 102, at p. 108,
just referred to, Lord MANSFIELD thus explains the law: " There is
a great difference between length of time, which operates as a bar to a
claim, and that which is only used by way of evidence. A jury is concluded by length of time that operates as a bar; as where the Statute
of Limitations is pleaded in bar to a debt; though the jury is satisfied
that the debt is due and unpaid, it is still a bar. So in the case of
prescription, if it be time out of mind, a jury is bound to conclude the
right from that prescription, if there would be a legal commencement
of the right. But any written evidence showing that there was a
time when the prescription did not exist is an answer to a claim
founded on prescription. But length of time, used merely by way Of
evidence, may be left to the consideration of the jury to be credited or
not, and to draw their inference one way or the other, according to circumstances."
In Kermer v. Summers, Bull. N. P. 74, YATES, J., told the jury that
thirty years' user of a right of way would afford a presumption of a right
of way; but he put it no higher. It is true that in two cases, the
first th'it of Balston v. Bensted, 1 Camp. 463, at Nisi Prius, the other

that of Bealey v. Shaw, 6 East 208, in bane, Lord

ELLENBOROUGHI

laid it down that " twenty years' exclusive enjoyment of water in any
particular manner afforded a conclusive presumption of right in the
party so enjoying it derived from grant or Act of Parliament." But the
decision in the latter case, which is expressly disapproved of by Lord
WENSLEYDALE in Masenwre v. Richards, 7 H. L. C. 386; 29 L. J.
(Ex.) 81, turned on the particular facts; and the law as there laid
down by the Chief Justice is not in accordance with the current
authorities, and is scarcely consistent with his own language in Campbell v. Wilson, 3 East 294. In that case a way had been used for twenty
years, but must have originated within thirty-seven years, as at that
time all ways had been. extinguished under an award, except such as
were therein set out, of which the way in question was not one, and
there was some reason to think on looking at the award that the way in
question had been used by mistake, but there was no evidence to show
that this was so; and the Chief Justice at the trial "left in substance
the question to the jury whether the enjoyment originated in a grant or
in any other manner." A new .trial having been applied for on the
ground of misdirection, Lord ELLENBOROUGH says, " Though by possibility the parties might, in fact, have acted on the mistake of the award,
yet on the evidence given nothing appears to show that they referred
their acts to the award, and, therefore, it comes to the common case of
adverse enjoyment of a way for upwards of twenty years, without any
thing to qualify that adverse enjoyment. On looking into the award
we might possibly suppose that the use of the way originated by mistake,
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but no evidence was given of any fact accompanying the enjoyment to
show that the parties acted upon such a mistake. There was, therefore,
no reason why the jury should not make the presumption as in other
cases, that the defendant acted by right, and that was in substance the
direction of the learned judge." From this language the Chief Justice
would appear to have treated the presumption arising from user as capable of being rebutted by the other circumstances of the ease if the evidence had warranted it. GROSE, J., said, "I cannot say that upon this
evidence, the jury might not make the presumption which they have
done, though had I been one of them, I do not know that I should have
dared to do so." And LAWRENCE, J., said, " N.o doubt adverse enjoyment of a right of way for twenty years unexplained is evidence sufficient for the jury to found a presumption that it was" a legal enjoyment,
and such in effect was the opinion of the learned judge in his direction
to them." " If in exercising the right of way from time to time it had
appeared that the party had asserted his right to be grounded on the
award, though it was exercised ever so adversely; I do not know how
the jury would be warranted in referring it to any 'other ground than
what the party himself insisted on at the time. The weak part of the
plaintiff's case is that it does not appear by the evidence that the enjoyment of the way did arise from mistake. Then if there were an adverse
possession for above twenty years, and not explained by any evidence,
why might not the jury presume a grant ?"
In 6ross v. Lewis, 2 B. & C. 686, which was an action for obstructing ancient lights, and in which the lights were proved to have existed
for thirty-eight years, BAYLEY, J;, when the case was before the Court
of King's Bench, on a rule nisi to enter the verdict for the defendant,
says: "I do not say that twenty years' possession confers a legal right;
but uninterrupted possession for twenty years raises a presumption of
right; and ever since the decision in Darwin v. Upton, 2 Win. Saund. 175
b., it has been held that in the absence of any evidence to rebut that presumption, a jury should be told to- act upon it." "LITTLEDALE, J.,
says, "The fhcts were sufficient to raise the presumption of a grant."
HOLROYD, J., who had tried the cause at Nisi Prius, says, " At the
trial I considered the windows in question as ancient lights, and that
the plaintiff had by law a right to enjoy them, and that it was not a
question to be determined by the jury without some evidence to contradict the idea of their being ancient lights." "A man may on his own
lands erect a house with windows looking towards his neighbour's premises. At first they may be obstructed, but if no interruption is offered
he may at length prescribe for them as ancient windows." The learned
judge was here evidently confounding two distinct things, prescription,
which in theory required to be carried back to time of legal memory,
but might be presumed from enjoyment to have had so l9ng an existence,
and an easement founded on the presumption of a lost grant, which was
the matter before the court; but be admits that if " evidence to contradict the idea of the windows being ancient lights had been offered, it
would have been matter for the jury."
In a still later case, that of Livett v. Wilson, 3 Bing. 115, in an
action of trespass, the defendant pleaded in justification a right of way
acquired by lost grant. On the trial it appeared that the premises occupied by the plaintiff and the defendant had formerly been in the hands
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of a single owner, who had conveyed part to a person under whom the
defendant claimed, but the right of way asserted was not reserved in the
conveyance. There was also some conflict of evidence as to the undisputed user of the way, but the weight of evidence on this point showed
that the right had generally been contested. On this evidence the
judge left it to the jury to say whether there had been uninterrupted
user for more than twenty years by virtue of a deed, and that such deed
had been lost, in which case they should find for the defendant; but if

they thought no way had been granted by deed, they should find for the
plaintiff. On an application fbr a new trial, BEST, C. J., uses this
emphatic language: "I think that the direction of the learned judge
was perfectly right, and that he went far enough. I do not dispute
that if there had been an uninterrupted usage for twenty years, the jury
might be authorized to presume it originated in a deed; but even in
such a case a judge would not be justified in saying that they must, but
they may, presume the deed. If, however, there are circumstances
inconsistent with the existence of a deed, the jury should be directed
to consider them, and to decide accordingly."
The case of Doe d. Fenwick v. Reed, 5 B. & A. 232, is not directly
in point to the present, yet it is analogous to it, and it deserves attention on account of a dictum of HOLROYD, J. It was an action of ejectment to recover property, into the possession of which the defendant's
ancestor had been admitted as a creditor after a judgment obtained against
the then owner, more than half a century before, till the debt should be
satisfied, and his family had remained in possession ever since. ABBOTT,
C.J.,in giving judgment, said : "I am clearly of opinion that the direction
was according to law. In cases where the original possession cannot be
accounted for, and would be unlawful unless there had been a grant, the
rule may, perhaps be different, and the cases cited are of that description. Here the original possession is accounted for, and is consistent
with the fact of there having been a conveyance. It may, indeed, have
continued longer than is consistent with the original condition. But it
was surely a question for a jury to say whether that continuance was to
be attributed to a want of care and attention on the part of the Charlton
family, or to the fact of there having been a conveyance of the estate.
As the defendant's ancestors had originally a lawful possession, I think
it was incumbent on him to give stronger evidence to warrant the jury
in coming to a conclusion that there had been a conveyance." And
HOLROYD, J., said: "liere the original enjoyment was consistent with
the fact of there having been no conveyance, for it was in satisfaction
of a debt. The true question was presented to the jury. In cases of
rights of way, &c., the original enjoyment cannot be accounted for
unless a grant has been made; and therefore it is that from long enjoy.
ment such grants are presumed. But even in these cases, evidence to
rebut such a presumption would be admissible."
The text writers are quite in accordance with these dicta and decisions. "The presumption of right in such cases," says Mr. Starkie (3
Stark. Ev., p. 911, 3d cd.)," is not conclusive; in other words, it is not
an inference of mere law to be made by the courts, yet it is an inference
which the courts advise juries to make wherever the presumption
stands unrebutted by contrary evidence.'
"This presumption,"
says Mr. Best, in his work on Evidence, sect. 380, "only obtains

ANGUS v. DALTON.

its practically conclusive character when the evidence of enjoyment during the required period remains uncontradicted and unexplained." "The presumption of right," says the same learned author
(s. 379, referring to what had been said by Lord ELLENBOROUGH
in Balston v. Bensted, 1 Camp. 462, and Bealey v. Shaw, 6 East 208),
"from twenty years' enjoyment of incorporeal hereditaments, is often
spoken of as a conclusive presumption, an expression almost as inaccurate as calling the evidence a ' bar.' If the presumption be I conclusive'
it is a prcsuniptio juris ct de jure, and not to be rebutted by evidence,
whereas the clear meaning of the cases is that the jury ought to make
the presumption, and act definitely upon it, unless it is encountered by
adverse proot.
And in his work on Presumptions, the same learned
writer, speaking of presumptions from user, writes: ."This presumption
only obtains its practically conclusive character when the evidence of
enjoyment during the required period remains uncontradicted and
unexplained ;" in support of which proposition he refers to Liett v.
JWilson, 3 Bing. 115. Mr. Taylor, in his valuable work on Evidence
(p. 795). classes the presumption arising from user and enjoyment
among what he terms " di putable" presumptions. "These," he says,
Ias well as the former"-that is conclusive presumptions-" are the
result of the general experience of a connection between certain facts
or things. the one being usually found to be the companion or the effect
of the other. The connection, however, in this class is not so intimate
or so unifbrm as to be conclusively presumed to exist in every case, yet
it is so general that the law itself, without the aid of a jury, infers the
one fact from the proved existence of the other in the absence of all
opposing evidence. In this mode the law defines the nature and amount
of the evidence which is sufficient to establish a prima faeid case, and
to throw the burthen of proof on the other party; and if no opposing
evidence is offered, the jury are bound to find in favor of the presumption. A contrary verdict might be set aside as being against evidence."
'The rules in this class of presumption," says Mr. Greenleaf (Gr.
on Evidence 734), "as in the former, have been adopted by common
consent, from motives of public policy, and for the promotion of the
general good, yet not, as in the former class, forbidding all further evidence, but only dispensing with it till some proof is given on the other
side to rebut the presumption raised."
The true principle is, as it seems to me, correctly stated in Mr. Goddard's learned and able treatise on the Law of Easements, p. 90. "The
whole theory of prescription depends upon the presumption of a grant
having been made. If, therefore, it can be shown that no grant could
have been legally made, or that any easement lawfully created must
have been subsequently extinguished by unity of seisin or otherwise, or
if it can be shown to be a very improbable thing that a grant ever was
made, the .presumption cannot arise, and the title by prescription fails."
An instance in which such a.presumption failed is to be found in the
casc of ]3,arke v. Richardson, 4 3. & A. 579, There lights had been
enjoyed for more than twenty years over land which, during part of the
time, had been glebe land. The defendant, a purchaser under 55 Geo.
3, e. 147, had obstructed the lights. It was held that a grant could not
be presumed. inasmuch as the rector, being only tenant for life, was
incompetent to grant such an easement.
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The books are strikingly deficient in decisions on the subject of the
easement of lateral support. I have ben able to find only two cases
prior to the passing of 2 & 3 Win. 4, c. 71, in which the right has
directly come in question. In some other cases which have occurred it
has been coupled with the question of negligence, and the decisions
have bad reference.to the latter question.. The subject is treated of in
Panerv. Feslhees, Sid. 167 (referred to in Com. Dig.. Action on the
case for Nuisance, C). The action, indeed, was for stopping up lights,
the facts being that a man having a piece of land, built a house on 1,art
of it, and sold the house to the plaintiff, and then sold the rest of the
land to'the defendant, who, building thereon, obstructed the plaintiff's
lights; and it was held that the action lay. In the course of the cause
it was resolved by the judges: (1.) That if a man, being scised of
land, leases forty feet to A. to build a house thereon, and forty feet to
B. for a like purpose, and one of them builds a house, and then the
other digs a cellar in his land which causes the wall of the first adjoining house to fall, no action will lie, for every one may deal with his own
to his best advantage; but, "semble," that it would be otherwise ifthe
wall or house were an ancient one. (2.) That if a man having a piece
of land, builds a house on part of it, and leases the house to one, and
the other part of the land to another, neither the lessor, nor any one
claiming under him, can stop up the lights, for otherwise it would be in
the power of the lessor to frustrate his own grant. Aliter, if the land
adjoining a house is the land of a stranger, for'the latter may build on
his own land, and the owner of the first house will be without remedy
unless such house were an ancient house, and the lights ancient lights.
The case does not, however, say what length of time willrconstitute a
house or lights "ancient," nor does it touch the subject of presumption.
No case in which the subject of support comes directly into question
occurs till that of Stansell v. JIollard, in 1803, which is shortly stated
in Selwyn's Nisi Prius, vol. i., p. 445, from the MS: of Mr. Justice
LAWRENCE. "In an action on the case," it is there said, "for digging
so near to the gable end of the house of the plaintiff, let to a tenant,
that it fell, Lord ErLENBOROUGE held, that where, as in the case before
the court, a man had built to the extremity of his soil, and had enjoyed
his building above twenty years, by analogy to the case of lights, &c.,
he had acquired a right to a support, or, as it were, of leaning to his
neighbor's soil, so that his neighbor could not dig so near as to remove
the support, but that it was otherwise of a house, &c., newly built."
From the language of this statement it would certainly appear that
Lord ELLENBOROUGH treated the twenty years as conclusive. But the
report is a very meagre and unsatisfactory one, depending entirely on
the accuracy of Mr. Justice LAWRENCE'S note. The decision appears
to have occurred at Nisi Prius. The probability is, as there does not
appear to have been anything to rebut the presumption arising from the
twenty years' enjoyment, that the judge told the jury they must act
upon such a presumption as one obtaining in the case of lights and
other easements. To have gone further would have been to go beyond
the necessity of the case. I cannot help looking upon this case of
Stansell v. Jollard,as one of very doubtful authority. I observe that
it has since been questioned in the case of Solomon v. Vintners' Conpany, 4 H. & N. 585 ; 28 L. J. (Ex.) 370.
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In some later cases, as I before mentioned, the complaint of the withdrawail of support was founded, not on the right of support absolutely,
but on the allegation of negligence in removing the adjoining building.
Thus, in Massey v. Goyder, 4 C. & P. 161, the grievance complained
of was the taking down an adjoining building, and digging the foundations of a new building erected in its place, without giving due and
proper notice to the plaintiff, the owner of an adjoining house, so as to
give him the opportunity of taking precautionary measures, as also in
respect of negligence in taking down the first building and in excavating.
It was there held by TINDAL, C. J., that if the defendants had used
reasonable and ordinary care in the doing of.the work, having given
due notice to the plaintiff, they would not be answerable in point of
law for damage caused to the plaintiff's premises. -In Brown v. Windsor, 1 Cr. & J. 20, which was an action for excavating under the
defendant's wall, on which the plaintiff's house, built twebty-seven
years before, rested, the complaint was of negligence in the manner in
which the work had been carried on, besides which there was proof that
the defendant had expressly authorized the resting of the plaintiff's
house on his wall. So in Dodd v. Holme, 1 A. & E. 493, the question
on which the decision turned was the allegation and proof of negligence. In I'eyton v. Mayor of London, 9 B. & C. 729, the cause of
action relied on was that the defendant, by taking down his house
adjoining that of the plaintiff, without shoring up, had injured the plaintiff's house. It was held that, as the plaintiff had not alleged or proved
any right to have his house supported by the defendant's house, the
defendant was not liable for what had happened. In Walters v. Pfeil,
1 M. & I. 862, the complaint was of negligence in taking down the
defendant's house, whereby the plaintiff's house was injured. There
was no question as to support from the adjacent soil. In none of these
cases did the right to lateral support come into question; and though
some of them have been cited in support of the plaintiff's case, I cannot see that they have any bearing on the question before us. ".
I am very far from saying that when houses or buildings have stood
for many years, especially when they appear to be of equal age, the
presumption of a reciprocal easement of lateral support ought not to be
made. It may reasonably be inferred that they were built under any
of the circumstances from which, at the present time, a grant would
properly be implied. Thus they may have been built by one owner, or
under a common building lease, or, if built by different owners, where
some arrangement for mutual support was come to. Thus, had the
plaintiff's premises remained in their original condition, I should have
been prepared to make-.the necessary presumption to uphold the right.
Where land has been sold by the owner for the express purpose of being
built upon, or where, from other circumstances, a grant can reasonably
be implied, I agree that every presumption should be made and every
inference should be drawn in favor of such an easement; short of presuming a grant when it is undoubted that none has ever existed. But
in the absence of any such circumstances, there is no form of easement
in which, as it seems to me, the doctrine of presumption should be
more cautiously and sparingly applied than the easement of lateral support. For this easement is obviously one of a very anomalous character.
In every other form of easement the party whose right as owner is pre-
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judicially affected by the user has the means of resisting it if illegally
exercised. In the case of the so-called - affirmative" easements he caft
bring his action, or oppose physical obstruction to the exercise of the
asserted right. Even in the case of another negative easement, and
which is said to approach the more nearly to this-that of light--the
supposed analogy entirely Ihils. For although no action can be brought
against a neighboring owner for opening windows overlooking the land
of another, there is still the remedy, however rude, of physical obstruction by building opposite to them. But against the acquisition of such
an easement as the one here in question the adjoining owner has no
rernedy or means of resistance,-unless, indeed, he should excavate in
his own immediately adjacent soil, while the neighboring house is being
built, or before the easement has been fully acquired, fbr the purpose
of causing the house to fall. But what would be thought of a man
who thus asserted his right? Or, possibly, as in the present instance,
he may have built to the extremity of his own land, and may require
the support of his soil to uphold his own house. Is he to endanger and
perhaps destroy his own house by excavating under it foi the purpose
of preventing his neighbor from acquiring the right of support? The
question, as it seems to me, answers itself. To say that by reason of an
adjoining house being built on the extremity of the owner's soil a right
of support is to be acquired in the absence of any grant or assent,
express or implied, against the adjacent owner, who may be altogether
ignorant whether the house or other building is-supported by his soil or
not, and who, whether he knows it or not, has no means of resisting'the
acquisition of an easement against himself, either by dissent or resistance of any kind, appears to me to be repugnant to reason hnd common
sense, as well as to the first principles of justice and right.
For these reasons I cannot entertain a doubt that-at all events as
the law stood before the passing of the Prescription Act, 2 & 3 Win. 4,
c. 71-the presumption of a grant, if any, arising in this case from the
support to the plaintiff's premises having been had for the twenty-seven
years, was open to be rebutted; and that when it was proved--or, what
is the same thing, admitted-that when the plaintiff's premises were
rebuilt-the original easement, if any, being, as I have already pointed
out, gone-the assent of the defendant's predecessors was not asked for
or obtained by grant, or in any other way, to any support being derived
from their soil, the presumption was at an end.
We have then to consider whether any alteration in the law as applicable to this ease has been introduced by the statute just referred to.
First, does the statute apply to the presumption of a lost grant at all ?
Secondly, if it does, does it apply to the easement under consideration ?
Thirdly, if it does, is the right of the party interested to rebut the presumption, by proving that no grant ever existed, taken away?
Now, it is first to be observed that the act professes to deal with the
matter of prescription alone. It is entitled, " An Act for shortening
the time of prescription in certain cases;" and what is here meant by
"prescription," if it admitted of any doubt, is immediately made
apparent by the preamble, which is in these words: " Whereas, the
expression ' time immemorial,' or time whereof the memory of man
runneth not to the contrary, is now by the law of England in many
cases considered to include and denote the whole period of time from
VOL. XXVI.-83
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the reign of King Richard I.,whereby the title to matters that have
been long enjoyed is sometimes defeated by showing the commencement
ueh enjoyment, which is in many cases productive of inconvenience
of .and injustice; for remedy thereof, be it enacted," &c. Then come the
remedial enactments of this strange and perplexing statute. What was
wanted was a fixed period of' prescription, such as is to be found in the
French and Italian codes, in which for easements at once continual and
apparent a prescriptive period of thirty years is fixed; in all others the
right can only be founded on positive proof of title, unless arising from
the disposition of a common owner. See articles 688-707 of the French
Code, and articles 629-6d0 of the Italian Code.- Thus fictitious presumptions, with us the arbitrary creation of the courts, and repugnant
at once to common sense and to the consciences of judges and juries,
are altogether got rid of.
But while this period of prescription is fixed by the statute at the
longvr period of sixty years in the case of rights of common and other
profits a, prendre, and of forty years in the case of "easement, unless in
either case it appears that the enjoyment had been had under some
deed or writing, with regard to any intermediate period it was enacted
that, after an enjoyment for twenty years without interruption by any
person claiming right, no claim shall be defeated by showing only that
the enjoyment commenced earlier than the twenty years. To both
enactments is, however, appended the important provision that "such
claim may be defeated in any other way by which the same iGnow
liable to be defeated."
By this roundabout, and it must be admitted, somewhat clumsy contrivance, so far as prescriptive rights were concerned, the presumption
arising from twentyyears' user or enjoyment was rendered a presumptio
jpris et de jure, and conclusive. But as regards the presumption of a
lost deed in rights arising from supposed grant, although the statute may
have introduced easements created by grant for the purpose of making
such rights indefeasible by prescription at the end of forty years,'it is
difficult to see how the presumption arising from an enjoyment for
twenty years can be in any way affected by the act. For such a presumption was never liable to be rebutted by evidence of a still earlier
user, which is the inconvenience which the statute professes to remedy.
On the contrary, the effect of such proof could obviously only be to
strengthen the presumption. The act does not go the length of saying
that the twenty years' user, in the case of easements, shall have any
greater effect than it had before. It is only to the exceptional easement
of light that it has given the character of indefeasibility at the expiration of the twenty years bf uninterrupted enjoyment-a special enact"ment which would have been wholly unnecessary if the effect cf the
general enactment had been to make all easements indefeasible at the
end of twenty years. The only conclusion, therefore, at which I can
arrive is that, as regards the effect of twenty years' user or enjoyment
in the matter of easements by presumed grant, 'the law stands exactly
as it did before the passing of the act.
But, secondly, is the easement we are dealing with within the act?
The act requires that the user or enjoyment shall have been under a
"claim of right" and " uninterrupted." A man builds a house on his
own land. He may lay the foundations so deep as not to need the sup-
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port of his neighbor's soil, or he may not do so, and the support may
be needed; but in the latter case the neighbor may not be aware of it,
and there is nothing to convey to him the knowledge that the support
is in fact had, nor, if he knew it, has he any means practically of preventing it. Is this an enjoyment "of right" within the first and second
sections of the act, according to the meaning put upon the term by this
court in Tickle v. Brown, 4 A. & E. 369 ?
Again, the enjoyment is required to be uninterrupted. Now, interruption may arise either from a disuser by the one party, or from physical obstruction opposed by the other. I take the statute to have contemplated interruption as arising from either cause. Can it have been
intended to include a form of easement to which no interruption could
be opposed by the party whose rights are to be prejudicially affected ?
But the answer to the third question may render the foregoing one
unimportant. Does the statute take away the right of the party denying the grant to rebut the presumption arising from user ? 1 answer
most assuredly not. For it says expressly, that "the claim may be
defeated in any other way by which the same is now" (that is. by the
then existing-law), "liable to be defeated." Now, nothing can. I think,
be more certain, for the reasons I have before given, and from the
authorities I have cited, than that the presumption of a lost grant from
twenty years' user was, under the previous law, capable of being rebutted, and so the claim defeated, by proof that no grant had ever
existed.
I find nothing in the decisions which have taken place since the
statute which shakes my confidence in the view I have expressed. The
mining cases, such as Hunpltries v. Brogden, 12 Q. B. 739; 20 L. J.
(Q. B) 10; Iharrisv. Ryding, 5 M. & W. 60 ; Rogers v. Taylor, 2 H.
& N. 828; 27 L. J. (Ex.) 173; Rowbotltam v. Wilson, 8 11. L. C. 348;
30 L. J. (Q. B.) 49; Bonomi v. Backhouse, E., B. & E. 355; 9 H. L.
C. 503; 34 L. J. (Q. B.) 181, are not at all in point. The right of
support there claimed was not of lateral but of vertical support, and
was not in the nature of an easement, but of a proprietary right-the
right of the owner of the surface land to have the support of the strata
below as of absolute right, independently of user or of right acquired
by enjoyment. This distinction was expressly pointed out by Lord
WENSLEYDALE, when the case of Bonomi v. Backhouse, 9 H. L. C.
503; 31, L. J. (Q. B.) 181, was before the House of Lords. He says:
" I think it perfectly clear that the right in this case was not in the
nature of an easement, but that the right was to the enjoyment of his
own property, and that the obligation was cast upon the owner of the
neighboring property not to interrupt that enjoyment."
The case of Brown v. Robins, 4 II. & N. 186; 28 L. J. (Ex.) 250,
comes nearer to the present, but nevertheless is plainly distinguishable.
It was an action for excavating beneath land adjoining the plaintiff's
house, and so causing the fall of the house which had been built on
land previously excavated beneath the surface, and which the defendants knew to have been so excavated. The plaintiff was held entitled
to recover;-to my mind a very questionable decision-but only on the
express finding of the jury that the land would equally have sunk if
no building had been superadded to its weight.
The case of .lartridgev. Scott, 3 M. & IW. 220, is still nearer to the
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present, and the language of the court with reference to the easement
claimed, which was one of support, is deserving of observation with
reference to the case before us. The plaintiff had built a house on land
whhli had been previously excavated by mining below. Four years
after the house was built the defendants in working a mine immediately
adjoining removed the minerals which afforded lateral support to the
plaintiff's house, without leaving sufficient to uphold it, but the removal
of the minerals would not have had that effect if the house had not
been built on excavated soil. It was held that no right of support
could be claimed under such circumstances, except by way of easement,
which of course could not have been acquired uider twenty years; the
language of the court leaving it doubtful whether, in their opinion, if
the support had been had for the twenty years a right thereto would
have been acquired. In delivering the judgment, Baron ALDERSON
says: " lie (the plaintiff) has, by building on ground insufficiently supported, caused the injury to himself without any fault on the part of
the defendants, unless at the time by some grant.be was entitled to
additional support from the land of the detendants. There are no circumstances in the case from which we can infer any such grant as to
the new house, because it has not existed twenty years, nor as to the old
house, because though erected more than' twenty years, it does not
appear that the coal under it may not have been excavated within twenty
years, and no grant can at all events be inferred, nor could the right to
any easement become absolute even under Lord TENTERDEN'S Act,
until after the lapse of at least twenty years from the time when the
house first stood on excavated ground, and was supported in part by the
defendant's land. If the law stood as it did before Lord TIENTERDEN'S
Act (2 & 3 Win. 4, e. 71, s. 2), we should say that such a grant ought
not to be inferred from any lapse of time short of twenty years after
the defendant4 might have been or were fully aware of the facts. And
even since that act the lapse of time under these peculiar circumstances
would probably make no difference. For the proper construction of
that act requires that the easement should have been enjoyed for twenty
years under a claim of right. Here *neither party was acquainted with
the fact that the easement was actually used at all; for neither party
knew of the excavation below the house. We should probably, therefore, have been of opinion that there was no user of the easement under
a claim of right, and that Lord TENTERDEN'S Act, therefore, would
not apply to a case like this. However, the ficts of this special case
do not raise that point."
The case of Jogers v. Tay.ylor, 2 IT. & N. 828 ; 27 L. J. (Ex.) 173,
is still nearer to the point. The plaintiff, having built two cottages on
waste belonging to the crown in the 5'car 1824, obtained a grant of the
surface from the crown exclusive of the minerals. In 1853 the defendant, who as tenant of the owner of the mines, was wcrking a quarry
underneath the house, cut away the supports of the roof of the quarry
under the house, which caused the house to fill. The judge at the
trial left it to the jury, from the enjoyment of the support for upwards
of twenty years.if they thought the enjoyment had been uninterruptedwhich was a question in the cause-to presume a grant from the owner
of' the quarry, and this direction was held by the Court of Exchequer
t., be right. But in this direction, which was given in deference to pre-

ANGUS v. DALTON.
vious decisions, and which I now think went to the extreme verge of
the law-for no one could have believed in the reality of such a grantthe effect of the enjoyment was only put as a matter of presulllptliol.
There is nothing to lead to the inference that, had there been rebutting
evidence, it ought not to have been submitted to the jury.
The only case which would appear to be adverse to this view is that
of hue v. Thorntorough, 2 0. & K. 250, in whichPAlti-KR:, B., at
Nisi Prius, held that where the house of the plaintiff had been
supported by the adjoining land of the defendatit for twenty years
to the knowledge of the defendant, the house of the plaintiff had
acquired a right to such support, so as to give the plaintiff a right to
damages for injury to his house by its withdrawal. But it isto be
observed that this was a decision at Nisi Prins. and which does not
appear to have undergone much consideration, and, what is more imporo
taut, there was no evidence to show the origin of the user or to rebut
the presumption arising from the continuance of the support and so to
negative, as is the case here, the presumption of a grant.
The same learned judge in Gayfubrd v. Nicholls, 9 Ex 702 ; 23 L.
J. (Ex.) 205, uses language which might imply an opinion that twenty
years' ejoynent would give an absolute right to support. There the
plaintiff's buildings had been injured by excavations made in the defendant's soil; but the buildings were modern, and it was held that the
plaintiff could not recover. PARKE, B., in delivering judgment says :
" This is not a case in which the plaintiff has the right of the support of
the defendant's soil either by virtue of a twenty years' oceupation. or by
reason of a presumed grant, or by a presumed reservation, where both
houses were originally in the possession of the same owner; for unless a
right of support by some such means can be established, the owner of the
soil has no right of action against his neighbor who causes the damage by
But this was obiter dictum, and
the proper exercise of his own right."
not necessary to the decision. The case of Arkwright v. Gll. 5 31. &
W. 203, is an authority on this question, as well as on the (uestion of
presumption. It was an action fbr diverting from certain cotton mills
water flowing down a mineral sough, and of whibh the mills had fbr
many years had the benefit. The stream was an artificial. not a natural
one. In giving the judgment of the court, the Lord Chief Baron
says, and his language is well worthy of attention " What is the-species of right or interest which the proprietor of the surfthce where the
stream issued forth, or his grantees, would have in such a waterc,,urse
at commdn law, and independently of the effect of user under the recent
statute 2 & :3 Win. 4, c. 71 ? He would only have a rig±ht to use it for
any purpose to which it was applicable, so long as it continued there.
A user for twenty years or a longer time would afford no presumption of
a grant of the right to the water in perpetuity ; for such a grant would
in truth be neither more nor less than an obligation on the mine owner
not to work his mines by the ordinary mode of getting minerals below
the level drained by that sough, and to keep the mines flooded up to
that level in order to make the flow of water constant for the benefit of
those who had used it for some profitable purpose. How can it be sapposed that the mine-owners could have meant to burthen themselves
with such a servitude -so destructive to their interests-and what is
there to raise an inference of such an intention ? The mine-owner
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could not bring any action against the person using the stream of water,
so that the omission to bring an action could afford no argument in fiavor
of the presumption of a grant ; nor could he prevent the enjoyment of
that stream of water by any act of his, except by at once making a
sough at a lower level and thus taking away the water entirely, a course
so expensive and inconvenient that it would be very unreasonable, and
a very improper extension'of the principle applied to the case of lights
to inter from the abstinence from such an act an intention to grant the
use of the water in perpetuity, as a matter of right." The learned judge
next proceeds to consider the case with reference to Lord TENTERDEN'S
Act. " It remains to be considered whether the statute 2 & 3 Win. 4,
c. 71, gives to 'Mr. Arkwright and those who claim under him any such
right, and we are clearly of opinion that it does not. The whole purview of the Act shows that it applies only to such rights as would
before the Act have been acquired by the presumption of a grant from
long user. The Act expressly requires enjoyment for different periods,
without interruption:' and therefore necessarily iinports such an user
as could be interrupted by some one I capable of resisting the claim,'
and it also requires to be ' of right.' But the use of the water in this
case could not bc the subject of an action at the suit of the proprietors
of the mineral field lying below the level of the Cromford Sough,
and was incapable of interruption by them at any time during the whole
period by any reasonable mode, and as against them it was not I of
right;' they had no interest to prevent it; and until it became necessary to drain the lower part of the field, indeed at all tines, it was
wholly immaterial to them what .became of the water so long as their
mines were freed from it." This reasoning, as it seems to me, implies
that the presumption arising from user may be negatived by the surrounding circumstances; more especially where the user could not be
interrupted by the party against whom the easement is claimed. In the
case before us the neighboring owner could not bring an action ; he
could not interrupt the user by anything he could do or could reasonably be expected to do.
As regards the natter of presumption, Cliasemore v. Richards, 7 HI.
L. C. 370 ; 29 L. J. (Ex.) 83, in the House of Lords, is very much to
the present purpose. It was an action for intercepting, by the formation of a reservoir on the defendant's own land, and the use of mechanical appliances, currents of water, which before ran under ground, and
percolating through the soil, fed the stream of' the river Wandle, on
which the plaintiff had an ancient mill worked by the stream, the supply of water to the mill being thereby diminished. In delivering the
opinion of the judges,.which was adopted by the House of Lords,
WIGIITMAN, J., says: " In such a case as thepresent, is any right derived
from the use of the water of the river Wandle for upwards of twenty
years for working the plaintiff's mill ? Any such right against another,
founded upon length of enjoyment, is supposed to have originated from
some grant from the owner of what is sometimes called the servient
tenement. By what grant can be presumdd in the case of percolating
waters depending upon the quantity of rain falling, or the natural
moisture of the soil ? and in the absence of any visible means of knowing to what extent, if at all. the enjoyment of the plaintiff's mill would
be affected by any water percolating in and out of the defendant's or
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any other land ? The presumption of a grant arises only where the
person against whom it is to be raised might have prevented the exercise of the subject of the presumed grant; but how could he prevent or
stop the per'colation of the water ?"
So here I ask how could the adjoining owner prevent the plaintiff's
'building from pressing latterly on his soil? Lord WENSLEYDALE
afterwards says (Ibid. p. 385): "I do not think that the principle on
which prescription rests can be applied. It has not been with the permission of the proprietor of the land that the streams have flowed into
the river for twenty years or upwards. I Qui non prohibet quod prohibere potest assentire videtur.' But how, here, could he prevent it.
?
He could not bring an action against the adjoining proprietor ; he could
not be bound to dig a deep trench in his own land to cut off the supplies of water in order to indicate his dissent. It is going very far to
say that a man must be at the expense of putting up a screen to window
lights, to prevent a title being gaiied by twenty years' enjoyment of
light passing through a window. But this case would go very far
beyond that. I think that the enjoyment of the right to these natural
streams cannot b supported by any length of user if it does not belong
of natural right to the plaintiff. For the same reason I dispute the
correctness of Lord ELLEBaOROUGH'S opinion in the case of the spring,
in Balston v. Bensted, I Camp. 463, where there had been twenty years'
enjoyment of it in a particular mode."
The lirinciple thus asserted is directly applicable to the present case.
low could the defendant's predecessor have prevented the plaintiffs'
house from being built on their own land ?
In Webb v. Bird, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 268; 30 L. J. (C. P.) 284, it was
held by the Court of Common Pleas (the judgment of which court was
afterwards affirmed on appeal, 13 C. B. (N. S.) 841 ; 31 L. J. (C. P.)
335), that an easement which was incapable of interruption was 'not
within Lord TENTERtDEN'S Act. The action was brought for obstructing the passage of air%to the plaintiff's wind-mill. That, of course, is
not this case, but the grounds on which the case was held not to be
within Lord T.ENTEaDEN'S Act are directly to the present purpose. "I
do not think," says EttML, C. J., "the passage of air over the land of
another was or could have been contemplated by the legislature when
framing that section. They evidently intended it to apply only to
the exercise of such rights upon or over the surface of the servient
tenement as might be interrupted by the owner if the right was
disputed. It is clear to my mind that that was the intention of the
legislature, because the section provides that the claim shall not be
defeated I where there has been actual enjoyment for the period mentioned without interruption.'
I am at a loss to conceive what would be
an interruption of such a right as is here claimed. In the case of a
way, the exercise or enjoyment of the right may be interrupted by the
erection of a gate or other impediment. So of the analogous right to
water. So a claim to lights may be obstructed or interrupted by the
erection of a boarding or other screen by the owner of the servient
tenement." And on the appeal in the Exchequer Chamber (13 C. B.
(N. S.) 843; 31 L. J. (C P.) 336), WIGTTIMAN, J., in giving the judgment of the court, says': "It has to be considered whether, independently of the statute, the right claimed may be supported upon the pre-
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sumption of a grant arising from the uninterrupted enjoyment as of
right for a certain term of' years. We think in accordance with the
Judgment of the Court of' Common Pleas and the judgment of the
House of Lords in ihasemore v. Richards, 7 I1. L. C. 349; 29 L. J.
(Ex.) 81, that the presumption of a grant from long-continued enjoyment only arises when the person against whom the right is claimed
might have interrupted or prevented the exercise of the subject of the
supposed grant." After referring to what has been said by Lord
WENSLEYDALE, in 0hasemore v. Richards, 7 H. L. 0. 349 ; 29 L. J.
(Ex.) 81. the learned judge continues : "In the pripent case it would
be practically so difficult, even if not absolutely impossible, to interfere
with or prevent the exercise of the right claimed, subject as it must be
to so much variation and uncertainty, as pointed out in the judgment
below, that we think it clear that no presumption of a grant, or easenmnt in the nature of a grant, can be raised from the non-interruption
of the exercise of what is called a right, by the person against whonr
it is claimed, as a non-interruption by one who- might prevent or
interrupt it."
In the case of Solomon v.
nitnr's Campany, 4 H. & N. 585; 28
L. J. (Ex.) 370, the facts were peculiar. Three contiguous houses
standing on a declivity had for thirty years been out of the perpendicular, the first leaning on the second, the second on the third. The lowest
house having been taken down, its removal caused injury to the highest.
An action having been brought, it was held that the action would not
lie, partly because there being an intermediate house no right of lateral
support could accrue, partly because-and it is on this point that Baron
BRA-MWELL rests his judgment-as an adjacent owner can never know
whether the neighboring building requires the support of his soil, or
may have sufficient support on its own foundations, the enjoyment cannot be said to be open, and therefore cannot be adverse. The Lord
Chief Baron, in his judgment, casts doubts on the authority of Stansell
v. Jollard, and t1yde v. Tltornborough, 2 C. & K. 250, cases on which I
have already commented.
The same question as arises in the present case was raised before
rice-*Jhancellor WOOD, in that of Runt v. Peake, John. 705; 29 L. J.
(Ch.) 785, and the authorities were gone into, but it became unnecessary to decide it, as the learned vice-chancellor was of opinion, as matter
of fact, that the land would equally have fallen had no building been
erected on it.
The last authority which I shall cite, but which appears to me conclusive to show that, notwithstanding Lord TENTERDEN'S Act, a presumption arising from user can be rebutted by showing that no grant
could ever have existed, is the case of Mill v. Commissioners of the
N'ew Forest, '18 C. B. 60; 25 L. J. (C. P.) 212. The claimant, an
allottee of waste land under an enclosure act, in an inquiry held under
17 & 18 Vict c. 49, an act for the settlement of claims upon and over
the New Forest, claimed a right of common in the waste lands in right
of such allotment, and proved an enjoyment for thirty years, exercised
as of right and without interruption, which it was contended gave an
absolute right under the first section of the act. But it was held that
the origin of the enjoyment might be shown, and that as by reason of
the statutes 9 & 10 Win. 3, c. 36, and 1 Anne, c. 7, the right could
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have had no origin in a grant from the crown, the claim could not be
sustained. After expressing a doubt whether Lord TENTERDEN'S Act
could operate so as to repeal the Act of Win. 3, JERvIS, C. J., says:
"It is, however, unnecessary to give any opinion upon that matter,
because I am of opinion that assuming that Lord TENTERDEN'S Act
does apply, still the claim cannot be supported. It is not sought to be
defeated or destroyed by showing onl that the right, profit or benefit
was first taken or enjoyed at any time prior to the period of thirty years,
but by showing that it never had any legal existence." And CRESSWELL. J., said: " I am entirely of the same opinion.
It seems to be
imagined by Mr. Smith that, because you cannot defeat a claim which
m ty be lawfully made at the common law by custom, prescription or
grant to any right of common or other profit h prendre, by showing only
that such right or profit was first taken or enjoyed at any time prior to
the period of thirty years, therefore you cannot defeat it at all. I do
not find that stated in Lord TENTERDEN'S Act. There is no attempt in
this case to defeat the claim by showing only its origin, but by showing
that it never could have had a legal origin." And WILLES, J., said:
"I am of the same opinion. What was done here was in fact this: It
was shown that the enjoyment commenced in 1810, so that it could not
give rise to the right claimed, and that it was impossible that any legal
grant of the right c ,uld have existed." This case, it is true, was decided
on the first section of the act, but the reasoning is just as applicable to
a case arising on the second.
It is scarcely necessary to point out that the rule established by
Pickard v. Sears, 6 A. & E. 469, and .Freeman v. Cooke, 2 Ex. 654,
18 L. J. (Ex.) 114, can have no application in a case where not only no
assent was in fact given, but as no assent was necessary, none can be
implied; in addition to which any opposition on the part of the adjoining owner would have been useless. Nor can the doctrine as to implied
grants apply, as at the time of the plaintiff's flctory being built the
premises belonged to different and independent owners.
For the foregoing reasons I am of opinion that any presumption
arising from length of enjoyment, as respects the easement of lateral
support to houses or other buildings, is one which, both at common law
and since the Act of 2 & 3 Win. 4, s. 71, is open to be rebutted; and
that if the fact that no grant was ever made is established, or from the
circumstances none can be implied, the presumption fails. It is beyond
all question in this case that no grant was ever made, or assent ever
given. Itis equally certain that there are no circumstancs from which
any grant, or agreement to make a grant, or assent in any form, can be
implied.
I am, therefore, of opinion that judgment must be given for the
defendants.
MELLOn.,
J.-I
have not thought it necessary to prepare a separate
judgment, as I have had an opportunity of reading the judgment of
the Lord Chief Justice, and that of my brother LuSH. I admit that
the case is not free from great difficulties, but I am satisfied that the
conclusion at which my Lord has arrived is the only one consistent with
the principles of our law; and of ordinary justice, and I entirely agree
with it.
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The rule will be absolute to enter the verdict for the defendants.
Lustt. J., delivered a dissenting opinion, the length of which prevents
our publication of it in full.

Judgment for the defendants.
It is worthy of notice that the process dation for the doctrine whatever. The
of reasoning, so successfully combatted
court deserves credit for being the first
by CocKUuN, C. J., in this case, and
to promulgate a rule so reasonable in
which the earlier English cases are sup- itself, but yet so apparently opposed to
posed to sanction, is identically the same
a long course of English decisions.
as that by which a right to light and air
The court coild find countenance and
over a neighbor's land has been thought
support, however, in the earlier cases in
to be acquired by the mere maintenance
America, which had taken the same
of a window overlooking the same for a
ground in regard to light and air. And
sufficient length of time to amount to a
in a recent case in Massachusetts, Gilprescription in other cases.
How enmore v. Discoll, 122 Mass. 207 (1877),
tirely such a doctrine has been repudithe learned chief Justice, in an elaborate
ated by the American courts, was shown
opitfion, said: "It is difficult to see
in a note to Stein v. flauck, in the LAw
how the oivner of a house can acquire
REGISTER for July, ante, p. 440. And by prescription, a right to have it supit is now to be observed that the same
ported by the adjoining land, inasmuch
dissatisfaction with the old English docas lie does nothing upon that land, and
trine as to prescriptive right to support
makes no use of it, which can be seen
for one's buildings had been already ex- or known, or interrupted or sued for by
pressed in America, many years in
the owner thereof, and therefore no
advance of the action of the Queen's
assent of the latter can be presumed to
Bench of England, as reported in the the acquirements of any right in his land
by the former. The English cases are
principal case. The question arose in
Georgia in 1873, in the case of Mitchell founded upon an analogy to the doctrine
of ancient lights, which is not in force
v. Hay8or, 4-c., 49 Georgia 19, and after
adverting to the English cases, and to
in this country." And while the Chief
the rule that adverse enjoyment is abso- Justice of Massachusetts was penning
those lines, the Chief Justice of England
lutely essential to the acquisition of a
right by prescription, and that by adverse was preparing an elaborate opiniondenying the force and application of these
enjoyment is meant an enjoyment of
which the adverse party could lawfully
very cases in England itself. And notwithstanding some inclination in a few
complain; which he could lawfully prevent or interfere* with ; which he could
American cases to blindly follow the suplawfully prosecute for ; the learned judge posed English doctrine, it is reasonable
(TRIrPE, J.) concludes that this rule
to conclude it will be all&wed no foothold
applies to rights of support, as well as
in our courts. See also 1 Am. Law.
Review, p. 10; Wood on Nuisances, p.
the more positive easements of ways or
water-courses, and that there is no foun-
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